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ABSTRACT
GHOSTWARE AND ROOTKIT DETECTION
TECHNIQUES FOR WINDOWS
Cumhur Doruk Bozag˘ac¸
M.S. in Computer Engineering
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. A. Aydın Selc¸uk
September, 2006
Spyware is a significant problem for most computer users. In public, the term
spyware is used with the same meaning as adware, a kind of malicious software
used for showing advertisements to the user against his will. Spyware programs
are also known for their tendency to hide their presence, but advanced stealth
techniques used to be either nonexistent or relatively primitive in terms of effec-
tiveness. In other words, most of the spyware programs were efficient at spying
but not very efficient at hiding. This made spyware easily detectable with sim-
ple file-scanning and registry-scanning techniques. New spyware programs have
merged with rootkits and gained stealth abilities, forming spyware with advanced
stealth techniques. In this work we focus on this important subclass of spyware,
namely ghostware. Ghostware programs hide their resources from the Operat-
ing System Application Programming Interfaces that were designed to query and
enumerate them. The resources may include files, Windows Registry entries,
processes, and loaded modules and files. In this work, we enumerated these
hiding techniques and studied the stealth detection methodologies. We also in-
vestigated the effectiveness of the hiding techniques against popular anti-virus
programs and anti-spyware programs together with publicly available ghostware
detection and rootkit detection tools. The results show that, anti-virus programs
or anti-spyware programs are not effective for detecting or removing ghostware
applications. Hidden object detection or rootkit detection tools can be useful,
however, these tools can only work after the computer is infected and they do
not provide any means for removing the ghostware. As a result, our work shows
the need for understanding the potential dangers and applications of ghostware
and implementing new detection and prevention tools.
Keywords: spyware, ghostware, rootkit, stealth, detection.
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O¨ZET
WINDOWS I˙S¸LETIM SISTEMI IC¸IN GHOSTWARE VE
ROOTKIT YAKALAMA TEKNIKLERI
Cumhur Doruk Bozag˘ac¸
Bilgisayar Mu¨hendislig˘i, Yu¨ksek Lisans
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Yrd. Doc¸. Dr. A. Aydın Selc¸uk
Eylu¨l, 2006
Spyware programları bilgisayar kullanıcıları ic¸in o¨nemli bir problem tes¸kil et-
mektedirler. Genel olarak ”spyware” terimi kullanıcılara reklam go¨stermek veya
internet tarayıcılarından alıs¸kanlıklarını takip etmek ic¸in kullanılan “adware” adlı
ko¨tu¨ niyetli programlar ile aynı anlamda kullanılır. Bu o¨zelliklerine ek olarak spy-
ware programları varlıklarını gizleme eg˘ilimleri ile de bilinirler, fakat bugu¨ne kadar
bu konudaki yeteneklerini ya kullanmadılar ya da oldukc¸a kıstlı kullandılar. Dig˘er
bir deyis¸le, kullanıcıyı takip etmede oldukc¸a gelis¸mis¸ olan spyware programları
kendilerini saklama konusunda bu kadar bas¸arılı deg˘illerdi. Bu sebepten dolayı da
dosya tarama veya windows ku¨tu¨g˘u¨ tarama teknikleri ile kolayca yakalanabiliyor-
lardı. Yeni spyware programları “rootkit” denilen kendilerini saklama konusunda
uzman programlarla birles¸erek kendilerini ustaca saklayabilen spyware’ler ha-
line geldiler. Kısaca “ghostware” adını verdig˘imiz bu programlar is¸letim sistem-
lerinin uygulamalara sundug˘u programlama arayu¨zlerini etkileyerek kendilerini ve
kaynaklarını saklayabilemektedirler. Bu c¸alıs¸mamızda ghostware programlarının
kullandıkları teknikleri ve onlara kars¸ı kullanılabilecek kars¸ı teknikleri inceledik.
Ayrıca popu¨ler anti-viru¨s ve anti-spyware programlarına ve kars¸ı teknik kullanan
arac¸lara kars¸ı etkililiklerini aras¸tırdık. Sonuc¸lara go¨re anti-viru¨s ve anti-spyware
programları ghostware programlarını yakalamada ve kaldırmada yetersiz kaldı.
Kars¸ı teknik kullanan arac¸lar nispeten bas¸arılıydı fakat bu arac¸lar sadece enfek-
siyon sonrası kullanılabildig˘inden ve sorundan kurtulmak ic¸in herhangi bir yo¨ntem
ic¸ermedig˘inden, ghostware programlarının tehlikelerini ve kullanım alanlarını an-
layarak yeni yakalama teknikleri gelis¸tirilmesi zorunlulug˘unu go¨sterdik.
Anahtar so¨zcu¨kler : spyware, ghostware, rootkit.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
At the end of the 90’s, when Internet became popular, banner advertising com-
panies started using new techniques for showing advertisements. Pictures at the
top or bottom of a web page were simply ignored by the Internet users, if adver-
tisements were not blocked by firewalls or other security products. Consequently
spyware was born, with the aim of showing more advertisements to the user,
sometimes without the need of having a website. The first samples were installed
as bundled into freeware and shareware applications such as peer-to-peer file
sharing programs. Their purpose was to display advertisements through pop-up
windows while the user is surfing the web.
The term “Spyware” first began to be used in the computer software context
in 1999 when Zone Labs used it in a press release for its Zone Alarm firewall
product [37]. In 2000, Gibson Research launched the first anti-spyware product,
OptOut. Steve Gibson, the developer of OptOut, states that “Spyware is any
software that employs a users Internet connection in the background (the so-called
backchannel) without their knowledge or explicit permission” [32]. Consequently,
spyware refers to software that was installed without the knowledge and consent
of users and that operates in stealth.
The actions of many spyware programs go beyond simply facilitating adver-
tisements or gathering non-personal data [9]. Today, they are using techniques
1
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similar to malicious threats ranging from silent installation to exploiting vulner-
abilities in operating system components. Furthermore, once installed on the
system, they are trying to stay resident and maintain their covert operations.
Many spyware programs are able to gather personal or confidential data and
transmit this data over network.
1.1 Spyware Types
A problem regarding spyware is the lack of a standard definition and categoriza-
tion. Some prefer a narrow definition that focuses on the surveillance aspects of
spyware and its ability to collect, store and communicate information about users
and their behavior. Others use a broad definition that include pop-up advertiser
applications, toolbars, search tools, browser hijackers and dialers. Definitions for
spyware also include hacker tools for remote access and administration, keylog-
ging and cracking passwords. In general, we can divide the spyware into two
parts:
• Adware: These programs are used for showing advertisements to the user.
We can categorize the types of adware like this:
– Browser Hijackers: Once installed in a users web browser, changes
its default start, search, and error page settings to alternative sites.
Browser redirection inflates the websites traffic gaining higher adver-
tising revenues, referral fees, and purchase commissions made through
the redirected website.
– Internet Explorer Toolbars: Internet Explorer allows users customise
the interface through dynamic loaded plug-ins called Browser Helper
Objects (BHO). Some plug-ins perform necessary functions, such as
the Yahoo Toolbar or Google Toolbar. However, spyware applications
can install and display themselves as toolbars, search bars, or task
buttons incorporated into Internet Explorer through browser plug-ins.
Various spyware toolbars spy, modify, and redirect web requests or
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cause indecent pop-ups and send information from the host,such as
XXXToolbar.
– Pop-up Advertiser Applications: Display advertisements based on en-
tered website URLs while surfing the web or specific keywords entered
through a search engine. Some spyware applications like Cydoor down-
load the advertisement database to a users workstation in the form of
a list of URLs during installation. Gator fetch advertisements based
on the users web surfing activity and some criteria programmed in the
application.
– Drive-by Downloads: Internet Explorer uses ActiveX controls to en-
hance the browsers functionality and provide interactive programs for
Internet like Shockwave and Flash. A drive-by download is a program
that automatically downloads to a users computer, often without the
users consent or knowledge and having full access to the Windows
operating system using exploits in browser.
• Stealth Malware: The term “stealth malware” refers to a large class
of software programs that try to hide their presence from operating sys-
tem (OS) utilities commonly used by computer users and malicious code
detection software such as anti-virus and anti-spyware programs. Stealth
techniques range widely from the simple use of hidden file attributes to
sophisticated code hiding in bad disk sectors, from user-mode API inter-
ception to kernel-mode data structure manipulation, and from individual
trojan OS utilities to OS patching with system-wide effect.
– Rootkits: A number of tools available to the owner of the tool, mak-
ing it available for connection and providing stealth features for the
attacker. Rootkit originally referred to a set of recompiled Unix tools
such as ps, netstat and passwd that would carefully hide any trace of
the intruder that those commands would normally display, thus allow-
ing the intruders to maintain “root” privilege on the system without
the system administrator even seeing them. Now the term is not re-
stricted to Unix-based operating systems, as tools that perform a sim-
ilar set of tasks now exist for Microsoft Windows operating system.
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A rootkit is often used to hide utilities. They are also used to abuse
a compromised system, by helping the attacker hide his access. For
example, the rootkit may hide an application that spawns a shell when
the attacker connects to a particular network port on the system.
– Trojans: Similar to rootkits, they are used to abuse a compromised
system, by opening backdoors to help the attacker subsequently access
the system and track victim activity. In general trojans include a set
of tools for data gathering. These tools can intercept network packets,
capture display and log key strokes. However, they do not include
advanced stealth features like a rootkit.
– Winsock Hijackers: A layered service provider (LSP) is between a
computers Winsock layer and TCP layer and can modify all data that
passes through the system. Spyware can install malicious LSPs to this
layer called Winsock Hijackers. They can monitor the network, access-
ing all data passing through the desktop, capable of redirecting web
requests to affiliate websites. Any attempt to remove these Winsock
hijackers can break the LSP chain and cause the Internet connection
to stop working.
– Man-in-the-Middle Proxies: Redirects all web surfing activity, includ-
ing secure connections, to a man-in-the-middle proxy under the dis-
guise of Internet connection accelerator. Can harvest sensitive infor-
mation such as passwords, credit card numbers, bank account infor-
mation, health care records, and confidential data.
1.2 Problem Definiton
In public, the term spyware is used with the same meaning as adware, since stealth
malware properties used to be either nonexistent or relatively primitive in terms
of effectiveness. In other words, most of the spyware programs were efficient at
spying but not very efficient at hiding. This made spyware to be easily detectable
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with simple file-scanning and registry-scanning techniques. Afterwards leading-
edge spyware developers such as CoolWebSearch evolved, and they employed
hiding techniques similar to windows rootkits, in order to avoid detection. These
program consists of two parts. First, they gather user data such as keystrokes
and network communications. Secondly, they hide their presence from the user
and/or make uninstallation difficult.
When stealth features first appeared in computer viruses their main purpose
was to make the work of anti-virus researchers and applications as difficult as
possible. Today the apparent blending of malicious code writing and hacking
gives stealth code a whole new perspective. One of the most important things for
any attacker after compromising a host on the Internet is to operate covertly on
the host as long as possible. This is where stealth code becomes useful, it makes
both the intruder and its backdoor operations be invisible to user and detection
tools. This emerged spyware with rootkit techniques, or as we call it ghostware.
Ghostware programs hide their resources from the OS-provided Application
Programming Interfaces (APIs) that were designed to query and enumerate them.
The resources may include files, Windows Registry entries, processes, and loaded
modules. Ghostware programs are the next generation of information security
problem. In this work we will show their potential, what they can do and how they
can escape being detected, to shed light on this new type of malicous software.
1.3 Related Work
There is not much academic work on spyware and ghostware. The academic re-
search on spyware began with the articles attempting to define the problem and
warn ordinary users for the potential dangers and capabilities of spyware pro-
grams. For example, [53] and [13] enumerated some methodologies for spyware
infection, while [19] and [11] defined a categorization of spyware. It becomes
a controversial issue when ACM Communications reserved August 2005 volume,
which included articles like [23], [1] and [61], however the volume does not
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include any research on this subject, the articles were about the discussion of
legal and ethical issues.
[62] and [2] explained how peer-to-peer programs and popular free programs
are used for the distribution of bundled spyware programs. [46] made experiments
on the effectiveness of spyware communication in a university campus network.
After all this noise, Microsoft took the problem seriously and formed a spyware
research group by buying Giant Anti-Spyware Networks. [59] explains their
offered technique for stopping spyware programs by monitoring Windows auto-
start points.
The rootkits were not taken seriously in the Windows world, as they were
considered as a problem for Unix users only. [40], [24], [21], [7] and [45] are
the pioneers of Windows rootkits. They defined hooking methods for Windows
API and showed numerous ways of alternating the data flow in memory space.
[25], [14], [22] and [49] also included a history of rootkit methodologies and
explanations on hooking methodologies.
Our problem, that spyware using rootkit techniques can be extremely effective,
was first introduced by [51]. [17] also points out this problem and [60] and [58]
is a research on the detection of ghostware, however their solution is not a public
release yet.
1.4 Structure Of This Thesis
In this work we focus on this important subclass of spyware, namely ghostware.
In Chapter 2, we will reveal their hiding techniques. In Chapter 3, we will enlist
the detection methods against these techniques. In Chapter 4 we will investigate
the effectiveness of their hiding techniques against popular anti-virus programs
and anti-spyware programs together with publicly available ghostware detection
and rootkit detection tools. We will also test detection techniques.
Chapter 2
Ghostware : Spyware with
Stealth Techniques
The main purpose of a spyware program is allowing continued access to the
computer without being detected during this time. As we explained in Chapter
1, spyware programs employ stealth techniques for this purpose. Software using
these techniques are generally called “stealth malware”, which refers to programs
that try to hide their presence from operating system (OS) utilities commonly
used by computer users and malware detection software such as anti-virus and
anti-spyware programs. In this paper, we will use the term “ghostware” [60] for
these type of programs.
Main idea behind stealth features is to alter the execution path of any func-
tionality in operating system such that calls to system services or returns of the
system calls are diverted to the ghostware. This is called “hooking”. After the
diversion, ghostware can modify the functionality or filter the return values in or-
der to hide any information which can reveal its existence. This includes function
calls used to enlist processes, files, services or ports. In order to understand the
concept of hooking first we need to understand how operating system responds
to kernel functionality requests.
7
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2.1 Operating System Kernel and Windows
API
The Intel x86 family of microchips use a concept called rings for access control.
The term ring appears to refer to the original 80386 architecture reference man-
ual’s drawing of the four levels of protection. There are four rings, with Ring Zero
being the most privileged and allowed total control of the processor, while Ring
Three being the least privileged, providing the most processor level protection as
shown in Figure 2.1. Internally, each ring is stored as a number and there are not
actually physical rings on the microchip [8].
Figure 2.1: Ring Structure
For the X86 processor systems, the use of other priority levels has been depre-
cated. Paging only has the concept of user or system access (priority 3 or priority
0, respectively). The processor and operating system work together to handle
transitions between the priority levels. The kernel itself, in both Linux and Win-
dows, runs in Ring 0, and a process running in Ring 0 is said to be at kernel level.
If a process runs in Ring 0, it can access all of the kernel’s memory structures,
and are therefore at the same level as the kernel code. User mode processes run
in Ring 3, are not able to access kernel space directly. By relying on Ring 0 and
Ring 3, all software on the machine is really carved up into two different worlds:
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kernel mode (running in Ring 0) and user mode (running in Ring 3) [22].
Figure 2.2: General Kernel Structure
The user mode is what users typically see and interact with on a day-to-
day basis on your system, as it includes the programs they run, such as a mail
program, office program, text editor or game. The kernel mode, is beneath this
system controlling the whole operation managing access to the hardware and OS
functions. When a system boots up, the kernel is loaded into memory and begins
execution in Ring 0. After the kernel gets itself set up in memory, it activates
various user-mode processes that allow individual users to access the system and
run programs.
The kernel is special software that controls various extremely important ele-
ments of the machine. We are interested in Windows malicious code, so from this
point, the word kernel will be used as Windows kernel. As illustrated in Figure
2.3, the kernel sits between individual running programs and the hardware it-
self. Performing various critical housekeeping functions for the operating system
and acting as a liaison between user-level programs and the hardware, the kernel
serves a critical role. It includes the following core features [49]:
• Process and thread control: The kernel dictates which programs run and
when they run by creating various processes and threads within those
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processes. A process is nothing more than some memory allocated to a run-
ning program, and the threads are individual streams of execution within a
process. The kernel orchestrates various processes and their threads so that
multiple programs can run simultaneously and transparently on the same
machine. Interprocess communication control. When one process needs
to send data to another process or the kernel itself, it can utilize various
interprocess communication features of most kernels to send signals and
data.
• Memory control: The kernel allocates memory to running programs, and
frees that memory when it is no longer required. This memory control is
implemented in the kernel’s virtual memory management function, which
utilizes physical RAM and hard drive space to store information for running
processes.
• File system control: The kernel controls all access to the hard drive, ab-
stracting the raw cylinders and sectors of the drive into a file system struc-
ture.
• Other hardware control: The kernel manages the interface between various
hardware elements, such as the keyboard, mouse, video, audio, and net-
work devices so various programs can utilize them for input and output
operations.
• Interrupt control: When various hardware components of the machine need
attention (e.g., a packet arriving on the network interface) or a program
encounters an usual event (e.g., division by zero), the kernel is responsible
for determining how to handle the resulting interrupts. By taking care of
the interrupt itself using kernel code or sending information to a particular
process to deal with it, the kernel keeps the system operating smoothly.
When most programs run, control may have to pass from user mode into
kernel mode, such as when the program needs to interact with hardware or use
some other kernel functionality. For this purpose control will be passed from user
mode to kernel mode, through tightly controlled interfaces. The software that
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Figure 2.3: Windows Kernel Structure
implements this transition from Ring 3 to Ring 0 is referred to as a call gate, as
it acts as a gate for user-mode processes into software living in kernel mode [38].
The programs that are run on a day-to-day basis, such as an internet browser,
make function calls into various Win32 subsystem DLLs to interact with the
operating system. When developers create programs to run on Windows, these
programs include Win32 function calls to the Windows itself, implementing the
OS API. Win32 functions have all kinds of capabilities, such as manipulating
the screen, opening files in hard disk or running other programs [36]. These
functions are grouped into several different files, each with its own lump of code
to accomplish certain tasks, including User32.dll, Gdi32.dll, Advapi32.dll, and
Kernel32.dll.
Function calls in user mode can do one of three things [50]:
First, if they don’t require kernel-level interaction with hardware or other
processes, a Win32 user mode function could just handle the request and send
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a response. For example, the GetCurrentProcessId function, returns a process’s
own process ID number.
Secondly, if handling of a function call from a user-mode application involves
the Win32 DLL needing information from a very special user-mode process called
Csrss.exe, which is is responsible for keeping the Win32 subsystem running. The
“csrss” is an abbreviation for Client/Server Run-Time Subsystem, and the ex-
ecutable keeps the Win32 subsystem operating by invoking user processes and
maintaining the state associated with each process. User-mode processes can ask
Csrss.exe for information about themselves or other processes without calling the
kernel.
Thirdly, a user-mode application could ask a Win32 DLL to take some action
that requires invoking a kernel function. For example, reading or writing file
means using the ReadFile or WriteFile function calls, which in turn requires the
corresponding Win32 DLL, ‘Kernel32.dll‘, to interact with the hardware. Ker-
nel32.dll will map the ReadFile and WriteFile function calls to another Win32
DLL called Ntdll.dll, which is quite an unknown and internal API. Ntdll.dll takes
the highly documented function calls of the Win32 API (like ReadFile and Write-
File), and convert them into the underlying function calls understood by the
kernel (called NtReadFile and NtWriteFile, respectively).
Ntdll.dll is responsible for making the transition from user mode to kernel
mode, jumping through a call gate into the kernel. Basically it invokes a kernel
functionality called the Executive, which has kernel mode responsibilities such as
making kernel function calls available to user mode, making various kernel-level
data structures available to other kernel-level processing, and managing certain
kernel state and global variables [49]. The Executive is placed in a file called
Ntoskrnl.exe. After being invoked it will determine which piece of underlying
kernel code is needed to handle a request and it will pass the execution to the
corresponding code. In the case of reading or writing a file, the Executive needs
to interact with hardware(hard disk), and it will accomplish this by using the
Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) of kernel. This layer is composed of device
drivers and the interface for reaching these drivers are implemented in a file called
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Figure 2.4: Passing Control from User Mode to Kernel Mode
HAL.dll, which makes various different vendor hardware products look consistent
to the kernel.
The transition from user mode to kernel mode, or from Ntdll.dll to the Ex-
ecutive is called system service dispatching. As shown in Figure 2.5, invoking is
accomplished by use of a CPU interrupt signal. Ntdll.dll triggers interrupt num-
ber 0x2E on x86-compatible processors to invoke this transition [49]. Inside the
Executive, there is a part called the system service dispatcher, looks at the para-
meters and type of the system call and looking up a table called system service
dispatch table it determines here the appropriate system service code to handle
the request is located in kernel memory. After that, execution flow is transitioned
to the appropriate kernel code. This is how a user-mode process can read from
or write to a file, or perform other interactions with the hardware.
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Figure 2.5: System Service Dispatching General Structure
2.2 User Mode Hooking Techniques
Hooking techniques are categorized according to where the hook is placed. (i.e.,
inside user space or kernel space) In the case of user mode hooking, ghostware
does not bother dealing with kernel code and directly attack user processes or
Win32 subsystem DLLs as shown in Figure 2.3. Instead it targets the APIs a
program uses. This makes sense when you consider that user applications must
rely upon the operating system to provide valuable functions such as opening files
and writing to the registry.
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2.2.1 Import Address Table Hooking
Windows uses a format called Windows Portable Executable (PE) format [35]
for executable files. This standard allows programs to run in any version of Win-
dows without the need of recompiling them. In order to provide this flexibility,
PEs use dynamic symbol loading by using indirect addresses. Any call to exter-
nal functions, such as from the ones in Win32 DLLs, are compiled so that the
CALL uses a memory address to take the call address from. When the operating
system loads the executable, it resolves all the external symbols and writes their
addresses to these memory locations [14]. Whenever an application uses an API
function exported from a DLL such, the compiler creates data structure called
IMAGE IMPORT DESCRIPTOR in the application. this structure contains the
name of the DLL from which the function is exported and a pointer to the Import
Address Table (IAT), which contains all of the functions exported by the DLL
that are used by the application. The table is filled with IMAGE THUNK DATA
structures, which consists of the memory addresses of the desired functions all
of which are filled by the Windows loader. When an application wants to make
a call to an imported function, first the program code calls into the IAT. After
reading destination address of the real function, another jump is made. By simply
modifying this table, a ghostware can re-route program execution through itself,
which allows filtering or manipulation of data [51].
Figure 2.6: Import Address Table Hooking
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2.2.2 Inline Function Hooking
An inline function hook is made by overwriting the code bytes of a target function
in a process so that whenever the function is called, it will first call the attacker’s
function, which in turn calls target function. There are two approaches in inline
function hooking. The first one is overwriting the actual executables or libraries
on hard disk. However, this approach requires disabling the Windows File Protec-
tion (WFP), if the target function is a Win32 DLL or executable. When any direc-
tory containing sensitive Windows files (e.g., the System32 directory) is changed,
the system signals WFP, invoking its functionality to check the digital signature
of the changed file. If the signature does not match a Microsoft-approved value
stored in the registry, WFP replaces the file with the proper Microsoft version
of the file [30]. The second approach is modifying the code in memory. First
attacker saves the first several bytes of the target function in what is called a
trampoline. Then he/she replaces these bytes with an immediate jump to a place
called detour. Detour calls the trampoline, which jumps to the target function
plus saved bytes. When the target function does its job and returns, the detour
can modify or filter the results and return to the source function that originally
called the target function [24]. The sequence is illustrated in Figure 2.7
Figure 2.7: Inline Function Hooking
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2.2.3 DLL Injection
DLL injection is forcing an unsuspecting running EXE process to accept a DLL
that it never requested. The malicious DLL will be loaded into the memory space
of the executable which allows the DLL to reach all data of the target. The idea
is first brought up by [39]. There are two techniques used for DLL injection.
First one is to use hooks. Windows API has a function called SetWindow-
sHookEx, which makes it possible to hook window messages in another process,
which will effectively load any malicious DLL into the address space of that other
process. SetWindowsHookEx is defined like this:
HHOOK SetWindowsHookEx(
int idHook,
HOOKPROC lpfn,
HINSTANCE hMod,
DWORD dwThreadId
);
The first parameter is the type of event message that will trigger the hook.
This can be a hook procedure that monitors keystroke messages. The second
parameter identifies the address to be called when a hook is triggered. The
virtual-memory address of the DLL that contains this function is the third para-
meter. The last parameter is the thread to hook. Using this method, whenever
a process is about to receive a keyboard event, the specified DLL will be loaded
[22].
The second technique is using remote threads. [12] provides a step by step
explanation of implementation and using Windows API for this purpose:
• Allocate space in the victim process for the DLL code to occupy. There
is a built-in function in the Windows API to accomplish this task, called
VirtualAllocEx.
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Figure 2.8: DLL Injection
• Allocate space in the victim process for the parameters required by the DLL
to be injected. This can be done using the built-in Windows VirtualAllocEx
function call, too.
• Write the name and code of the DLL into the memory space of the victim
process. The WriteProcessMemory function of Windows API call can be
used to write arbitrary data into the memory of a running process.
• Create a thread in the victim process to actually run the newly injected
DLL. The CreateRemoteThread function in Windows API starts an exe-
cution thread in another process, which will run any code already in that
process, including a newly injected DLL.
• Free up resources in the victim process after execution is completed. The
resources consumed by this technique can be freed after the victim thread
or process finishes running, using the VirtualFreeEx function of Windows
API.
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2.3 Kernel Mode Hooking Techniques
User mode hooking is useful and easy to implement, but also it is relatively easy
to detect and prevent. With a user mode ghostware, the attacker has to break
into the system and modify a number of programs to stay resident and consider
all possible ways that can reveal itself. Moreover, since anti-malicious programs
run in kernel mode, they will be one step ahead and ghostware will have a lower
chance of survivability. A better solution would be installing a kernel memory
hook. A kernel mode hook and consequently kernel memory access rights will
make the ghostware on equal footing with any detection software. What is more,
the attacker just modifies the kernel so that it lies to any particular command or
program run by the administrator looking for that file. In this way, kernel mode
hooking is far more efficient.
Figure 2.9: Kernel Mode Hooking Techniques
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2.3.1 System Service Dispatch Table (SSDT) Hooking
As we have explained in section 2.1, System Service Dispatch Table (SSDT)
plays an important role in system service call mechanism provided by the kernel,
for letting the user-mode code use its services. For example, whenever a user-
mode application needs access to files, registry or process objects, it calls the
appropriate Windows API call, which eventually generates a system service call
that is then handled by the kernel. First introduced by [40], SSDT hooking is a
powerful and widely adopted kernel-mode technique. Attacker simply changes the
content of the table and puts the hook function’s address instead of the address
of the internal kernel function that implements the corresponding service. After
that, any call to the specific system service can be intercepted. [25] The process
is illustrated in Figure 2.10.
Figure 2.10: System Service Dispatch Table Hooking
Some versions of Windows come with write protection enabled for certain
portions of memory. This becomes more common with later versions, such as
Windows XP and Windows 2003. These later versions of the operating system
make the SSDT read-only because it is unlikely that any legitimate program
would need to modify this table. However, as we commented before, a kernel
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mode ghostware is on equal footing with any kernel program, so this was not
enough to stop hooking. By simply modifying the WP bit in the processor’s CR0
register, write protection can be overwritten [41].
2.3.2 Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) Hooking
Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) is used to handle interrupts. Interrupts can
originate from software or hardware. In the system call flow, Ntdll.dll triggers
interrupt number 0x2E to invoke kernel, which happens right before usage of
SSDT. The IDT specifies how to process interrupts, so a kernel mode hooking
can be realized by writing address of the hook function for interrupt number 0x2E.
Unlike other hooks, execution control does not return to the IDT handler, so the
typical hook technique of calling the original function, filtering the data, and
then returning from the hook will not work. The IDT hook is just a pass-through
function and will never regain control, so it cannot filter data. Consequently this
technique can only be used for identifying or blocking requests [22].
2.3.3 Input/Output Request Packet (IRP) Function Ta-
ble Hooking
Another possible location for kernel mode hooking is function tables in device
drivers. Whenever a driver is installed, it initializes a table of function pointers
that have the addresses of its functions to handle different types of I/O Request
Packets (IRPs). IRPs are used for several types of requests, such as reads, writes,
and queries.
The driver and IRP type to hook depends on attackers purpose. For example,
this technique can be used for hiding TCP or UDP ports. you could hook the
functions dealing with file system writes or TCP queries. However, just like the
IDT, major IRP handling functions do no return the execution flow, so normally
filtering the results is not possible. In order to use IRP for altering a query,
attacker changes the control flags, which enables execution of a callback function
CHAPTER 2. GHOSTWARE TECHNIQUES 22
Figure 2.11: I/O Request Packet Function Table Hooking
after IRP handler. I/O Manager will call the IoCompletionRoutine of the IRP
and after the handler has successfully finished processing the IRP and filling in
the output buffer with the requested information. By hooking the IoCompletion-
Routine attacker can filter query results [22].
2.4 Direct Kernel Object Memory Access
Instead of using a device driver, an attacker could directly patch the kernel in
the memory of the victim machine, a technique first described in detail by [21].
The technique is built upon the memory handling in Windows, specifically with
regard to the CPU running in Ring 0 and Ring 3. The Global Descriptor Table
(GDT) contains information about how memory is divided into various segments,
allocated to user programs and the kernel itself. All memory locations between
0x80000000 and 0xC0000000 are for use by the kernel and restricted to user-mode
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processes. The GDT stores data about how various memory segments are placed
and access rights for each memory segment. The tricky part of GDT is, same
range of memory addresses can be defined in multiple segments. By use of some
Windows API weaknesses, a malicious process can add a new entry to the GDT,
thereby describing a new segment that maps to a whole memory range, that is,
a memory space starting at 0x00000000 and going to 0xFFFFFFFF. Using this
technique, the malicious process can access everywhere in kernel memory.
Figure 2.12: Process List Before Modification using DKOM
After gaining access rights for reaching every part of memory, a malicious
process can hide processes, elevate their privilege levels, or perform other modifi-
cations. As an example, the Windows operating system’s list of active processes is
obtained by traversing a doubly linked list referenced in the EPROCESS structure
of each process. When a user-mode application sends a request for the process
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list, the appropriate system service function traverses the linked list and sends the
data back to the client. Specifically, a process’s EPROCESS structure contains a
LIST ENTRY structure that has the members FLINK and BLINK. FLINK and
BLINK are pointers to the processes in front of and behind the current process
descriptor, as shown in Figure 2.12 [7].
Figure 2.13: Process List After Modification using DKOM
By simply changing the FLINK and BLINK pointer values of the forward
and rearward EPROCESS blocks to by-pass a process, we can make that process
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invisible, as shown in Figure 2.13.
Chapter 3
Ghostware Detection Techniques
Most of the malicious software detection techniques are based on the signature
matching approach used by anti-virus software. Each file execution and program
installation is investigated to determine file signatures for use by malicious code
scanner. In the case of spyware, this technique will only work during the load-
ing phase, which allows the anti-virus program to quarantine the file so that it
cannot be executed or installed. If the spyware is using stealth techniques and it
was loaded before the activation of anti-virus program, then standard detection
techniques will fail, since a ghostware can potentially by-pass the scanner. With
the appearance of the stealth techniques, detection softwares become pretty weak
and developers decided to improve detectors by adding forensic tools and behav-
ioral detectors. In this chapter we will explore the stealth detection techniques
used/usable for detecting ghostware.
There are two basic approaches to stealth detection. The first approach looks
for the hiding mechanism such as API interceptions or hooks. There are three
problems with this approach. First, there are many loading methods using differ-
ent entry points for hooking. The detection software need to look for all of these
points and updated frequently. This was the problem with ’Pedestal Software’s
Integrity Protection Driver’ [34], which is no longer supported by the developer.
The second problem is, it may catch many false positives due to legitimate uses
of API hooking by detectors, debuggers or in-memory software patching. And
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finally, if ghostware is capable of tracking detection attempts, it may use its hooks
for deceiving the detector.
Second technique is ’cross-view based detection’. Detector snapshots two view
of the system, a “high level” view and a “low level” view. The high level view will
show what the stealth software wants the user to see, with hidden files, processes
and other objects out of sight. The low level view is will contain everything
actually present on the system, including the hidden objects. The difference of
these two views, if exists, will be hidden objects.
Figure 3.1: Cross-view Detection Mechanism
The main problem with this approach is getting the views. First of all, getting
a low level view may not be easy especially for every object type. The operating
system need to be clean and yet there is not enough documentation for getting a
low level view. The technique must work deeper than any hooking technique to
get the data untampered. This can mean replicating or manipulating operating
system functionality or taking advantage of undocumented data structures to
acquire this view. Moreover, the ’high level’ view must be tainted. One API
function may not see a hidden file and yet others may be unaffected, so the the
file may be hidden only from a certain perspective, which high level view must
consider. Also, a ghostware can temporarily reveal the objects it was hiding, after
noticing a detection attempt, detector should not reveal itself.
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3.1 Hook Detection
There are many places where a hook can be hidden, as we explained in Chapter
2, including:
• Import Address Table (IAT)
• System Service Dispatch Table (SSDT)
• Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) with one per CPU
• Drivers’ I/O Request Packet (IRP) handler
• In-line function hooks
The basic algorithm for identifying a hook is tracing the execution flow and
looking for branches that fall outside of an acceptable range. Such branches would
be produced by instructions like call or jmp. Defining the acceptable range maybe
a problem, depending on the situation.
In a process Import Address Table (IAT), the name of the module containing
imported functions is listed. This module has a defined start address in memory,
and a size which defines the acceptable range. All legitimate I/O Request Packet
(IRP) handlers should exist within a given driver’s address range, and all entries
in the System Service Dispatch Table (SSDT) should be within the address range
of the kernel process, Ntoskrnl.exe. Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) hooks can
be a problem since there is no well defined address range here except the INT 2E
handler, which should point to the kernel, Ntoskrnl.exe. In-line hooks are quite
hard with this technique, since imported functions can be in another module.
Detector may need a complete disassembly of the function in order to find check
validity of address. VICE [5] uses this technique for detecting ghostware [22].
Another way for finding hooks in APIs and in system services is tracing and
counting execution calls.The idea is quite simple and elegant, if the ghostware has
compromised the system and trying to hide something by changing some execu-
tion path, then system will be executing extra instructions, during some typical
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system and library calls. In order to implement instruction counting, detector
can use a nice feature of Intel processors, the so called single stepping mode.
When the processor is working in this mode, it will generate debug exception af-
ter every instruction which was executed [45]. After recording execution path in
a clean system, the detector can perform execution tests checking to see whether
additional instructions have been executed in subsequent calls when compared to
the baseline. This method is implemented in Patchfinder [44].
Another detection technique is employed by modGREPER [42], which
searches through whole kernel memory (0x80000000 0xffffffff) in order to
find structures which looks like a valid module description objects. It recog-
nizes specific structure types used in hooking like DRIVER OBJECT and
MODULE DESCRIPTION and builds a list of found objects. After that, mod-
GREPER matches them to each other and finally compares this list against the
list of kernel modules obtained with documented API.
Another detection technique is based on the fact that code sections are read-
only in kernel memory, so programs should not modify their code under normal
circumstances. System Virginity Verifier (SVV) [43] uses this technique for
detecting ghostware. SVV checks if the code sections of important system DLLs
and system drivers (kernel modules) are exactly same in memory and on disk.
The difference can reveal a hook as shown in Figure 3.2. However this can also
be possible due to page faults and memory relocations, so this technique needs
careful handling of all possible OS modifications.
3.2 Hidden File Detection
Windows File Protection (WFP) provides some protection against file changes,
but employing additional file integrity checking tools for intrusion detection or
hidden file detection is a good practice against ghostware. The most famous
file integrity checking tool is Tripwire [56]. These tools look for changes to
critical system files and registry settings based on cryptographic hashes of known
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Figure 3.2: System Virginity Verifier
good files and settings. By this way, they can can spot file changes made to the
operating system files, probably by a kernel-mode ghostware.
Another tool for ghostware detection is Rootkit-Revealer [10]. It can detect
hidden registry entries as well as hidden files using cross-view difference. For the
low-level view, Rootkit-Revealer parses the files that correspond to the different
Registry hives without the aide of the standard Win32 API calls, such as Re-
gOpenKeyEx and RegQueryValueEx. It also parses the file system at a very low
level, avoiding the typical API calls. High-level view is taken by the system API
task manager uses. Comparison of these views reveal hidden objects.
Another detection tool is developed by Microsoft Research, GhostBuster [60],
which implements the cross-view difference based detection for files, registry and
processes. GhostBuster can perform low-level and high-level scans as an inside-
the-box solution, while it can also be used as an outside-the-box solution, per-
forming low-level scan during a Windows Preinstallation Environment [28] CD
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boot. GhostBuster uses the Master File Table, the Raw Hive Files, and the Ker-
nel Process List as the low-level resources to detect hidden files, registry entries,
and processes, respectively [58].
3.3 Hidden Process Detection
One way of detecting hidden process is through ’CSRSS.EXE’. Detector can track
the handles in CSRSS.EXE and identify the processes to which they refer and use
this as a low-level view for cross-view difference based detection. Every process’s
EPROCESS block contains a pointer to a structure that is its HANDLE TABLE.
[41] These handle table structures are linked by a LIST ENTRY, similarly to the
way all processes are linked by a LIST ENTRY. By finding the handle table for
any process and then walking the list of handle tables, detector can identify every
process on the system. This technique is used by F-Secure BlackLight [16].
Last detection technique is specially effective against hidden processes hidden
by DKOM as explained in Chapter 2.4. The SwapContext function in Ntoskrnl.exe
is called to swap the currently running thread’s context with the thread’s context
that is resuming execution. When SwapContext has been called, the current
thread address and next thread address are saved. By using the Detour technique
in Chapter 2.2.2 for verifying that the KTHREAD of the thread to be swapped in
points to an EPROCESS block that is appropriately linked to the doubly linked
list of EPROCESS blocks, one can detect hidden processes [7].
Chapter 4
Experiments and Evaluation
After explaining the stealth techniques in Chapter 2 and detection techniques in
Chapter 3, now we will investigate the practical effectiveness of detection tech-
niques against current ghostware programs.
4.1 Methodology
The test case consists of both kernel-mode ghostware and user-mode ghostware.
For the kernel-mode ghostware, we implement a modular structure for inject-
ing hooks. The hook codes are implemented as system drivers and there is a
loader/unloader system at the core using the Service Control Manager (SCM).
When a driver is loaded using the SCM, it is non-pageable and IRP-handling
functions, and other important code will be resident on the memory. Figure 4.1
shows the design structure.
The kernel-mode ghostware includes components for hiding processes, files
and ports. For process hiding it uses the SSDT hooking technique explained in
Chapter 2.3.1 and DKOM technique used by FU rootkit [18] as explained in
Chapter 2.4. For both techniques we define a keyword, which is “ cool ” in our
case, and hide every process that includes this string in its name. For file hiding we
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Figure 4.1: Test Case Kernel-Mode Ghostware Structure
also use the SSDT hooking technique. We hide every file or folder which includes
“ cool ” in its name and of course all file names of this program starts with
“ cool ”. For the port hiding case, we used the IRP hooking technique explained
in Chapter 2.3.3, hiding port 80 in TCP and UDP connections. Furthermore, we
also include FUTo [48] in our tests, an expansion to FU rootkit which handles
some weaknesses in FU by manipulating more tables,like PspCidTable, for hiding
objects.
In the case of user-mode ghostware, instead of implementation, we decided
to use the best user-mode hacker toolkit, Hacker Defender [20], for our tests.
It is capable of hiding processes, files, ports, services and registry keys using
DLL injection as explained in Chapter 2.2.3. This is an open source project
and we recompiled all the code before testing it. We also changed driver name,
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service names, process names and polymorph the executable with a polymorphic
encryptor called Morphine [29] for avoiding easy detection. Similar to the kernel-
mode ghostware, this hides every process or file or folder with the name hxdef in
it.
The test bed is a virtual machine using VMWare [57] software loaded with
Windows XP operating system. The test cases can be categorized into three
parts. We first used the best three anti-virus software, which are claiming to
be highly effective in detection and prevention of spyware. (namely, Symantec
Norton Anti-Virus 2006 [54], McAfee Anti-Virus/Anti-Spyware Program [27] and
Panda Anti-Virus+Anti-Spyware Titanium 2006 [33])
The tests are performed in three phases. First we load ghostware, install anti-
virus program and make a full scan to see if the program can detect previous
infections. We call this a “pre-load” test. Then we restart the computer and run
ghostware while anti-virus program is active and monitoring the computer, to see
if the program can detect any hooking or loading attempt. We call this a “load”
test. Finally we scan the folders of ghostware, without running them, in other
words make a manual scanning directly to the malicous code files to see if the
program can detect the malicious code by signature.
We also run tests with anti-spyware programs by picking the three most pop-
ular commercial ones, which are Lavasoft Adaware SE Professional 1.06 [26],
Bulletproofsoft Spyware And Adware Remover v9.3 [4] and Etrust Pestpatrol
Anti-Spyware 2005 [15]. We also include a widespread free tool called Spyware
Doctor v4.0 [52]. We apply the same testing approach to these files. Finally
we try detection with the tools mentioned in Chapter 3 such as: VICE,Rootkit-
Revealer, System Virginity Verifier and Flister. The implementers of FU rootkit
suggested another detection technique that we can call as Swap Context-Detour
Patching and provided some coding, which we included in our tests. We also
included F-Secure BlackLight [16], a commercial hidden process and hidden file
detector. Furthermore we made tests with IceSword, which is a ghostware detec-
tor in development phase originating from China and RAIDE [6], an academic
work for rootkit detection. All these tools can only work as detectors so we run
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and test them after the ghostware is loaded and running.
4.2 Test Results
The anti-virus test results, is shown in Table 4.1. The tests show that anti-
virus (AV) programs are weak against ghostware. First of all one would expect
the signature matching algorithms of these programs to be stronger. We used
the exact FU rootkit hooking code for process hiding with DKOM, and we only
recompiled it, yet none of the AV programs managed to detect it when we scan
the files. On the contrary, quite surprisingly, Norton managed to detect FUTo,
an expansion of FU. Furthermore, McAfee and Norton managed to detect system
driver and the config file of Hacker Defender, which we could not polymorph. In
our opinion, standard signature matching algorithms are not reliable for detecting
ghostware and this is why they need detection by behavior. Only Norton anti-
virus employed this technique and it did not catch the hooking behavior, instead
it caught the encryption/decryption code we used for Hacker Defender. Norton
quarantined the executable saying it may contain malicious code, which allowed
detection of Hacker-Defender while loading. None of the anti-virus programs
include any method for scanning hidden files or processes, so none of them worked
in the pre-load test.
The anti-spyware test results, are shown in Table 4.2. The tests show that
anti-spyware (AS) programs, in general, are not capable of removing or detecting
ghostware. These programs seem to be designed for detection of adware. They
include features like Browser Helper Object (BHO) scanning, registry scanning,
or file scanning for known adware signatures. None of them was able to detect
our samples except Spyware Doctor, which detected user-mode ghostware and
FU code. Furthermore, Spyware Doctor managed to detect the hidden process
by FU in load and pre-load tests.
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Table 4.3 shows the ghostware and rootkit detection tools test results. Some
tools are made for specific purposes, such as Rootkit-Revealer only searches for
hidden files and hidden registry entries. As a result it is not included during tests
of techniques that hide process and this is shown as ’n.a.’ in the results. The
techniques in the table (the columns) can be can be thought to be more complex
and hard to detect from left to right. In this context, the trend of having more
successful detection on the left and having less detection on the right makes sense.
VICE, SVV and ModGreeper are old tools and they were released before DKOM
techniques were invented. As a result, although they are quite successful in user-
mode techniques and kernel-mode techniques, they have no use against DKOM
techniques. ModGreeper did not work at all, so we think it was build for specific
purposes, i.e., to detect specific techniques, which we did not test.
Figure 4.2: Vice detecting SSDT hooking
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Figure 4.3: System Virginity Verifier by Ruanna Rutkowska
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Swap Context-Detour Patching technique was quite successful for detecting
all kinds of hidden processes except the one used by FUTo. Figure 4.4 shows
hidden process detection by this technique.
Figure 4.4: Hidden Process Detected by Swap Context-Detour technique
Blacklight and Icesword also shine in our tests and they detected all techniques
except FUTo, but we need to add the fact that FUTo was developed against these
two tools. Especially IceSword offers various options to the user for detecting not
only ghostware but also techniques used by other kinds of spyware such as BHOs.
While Blacklight can only detect hidden processes and files, IceSword can detect
registry entries, services, drivers, ports etc. In Figure 4.5, we can see IceSword
revealing hidden files and folders.
Finally, we were particularly impressed by RAIDE, an academic research
project on beta phase. RAIDE not only detects the hooks, it also offers options for
removing the hook, deleting the hidden object etc., though, removal algorithms
do not work well and we received a number of Blue Screen of Deaths(BSoD)
during our testing. Figure 4.6 shows RAIDE command window detecting FUTo
technique.
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Figure 4.5: IceSword showing hidden files
The test results show us that anti-virus programs and anti-spyware programs,
as they exist today, are ineffective against the ghostware threat. Even specific
tools made for detecting hidden objects or hooks in system are not capable of
detecting all of the rootkit or ghostware attack techniques.
4.3 Data Mining Approach
We have seen that signature based approaches are weak against new threads, so
we also investigated the use of data mining based heuristic scanning technique
proposed by [47]. The idea is, malicious executables have common intentions
and they may have similar byte code. He claims that, we can detect malicious
executables by looking at the frequency analysis of byte code in a file. We need
to first form a model for byte frequencies by forming a two distinct datasets of
benign and malicious executables. First we train our model using these datasets,
and then we test it on new executables.
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Figure 4.6: RAIDE detecting FUTo hooking
We applied this technique on spyware programs by forming our own datasets
in [3]. The dataset consisted of 312 benign(non-malicious) executables and 555
spyware executables. The malicious collection was formed by using a malicious
code collection at [31] and manually collecting spywares by crawling the inter-
net using a sandboxed operating system. The benign executables were collected
from the system files in Windows XP operating system and from programs of
a stereotype user. Byte sequences were extracted using the hexdump tool. For
each file in the dataset, using this tool a hexdump file is formed. The tests were
made using the 5-fold cross validation technique. According to the results, we
had 91.28% accuracy and 4.92% false positive rate in our dataset, which was quite
promising and data mining based heuristic scheme has the potential to be used
for detecting new spyware programs.
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Using the exact byte sequence model in our previous tests, we applied this
technique on our ghostware samples. The test results in Figure 4.4 show that,
our model was not very successful on detecting ghostware programs. This is
probably due to the fact that out training dataset included not only ghostware
type of spyware, but all kinds of spyware. However, the technique relies on the
idea that executables with common intentions and will have similar byte code.
We do not have enough number of ghostware samples to form a ghostware specific
byte frequency model.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
When stealth features first appeared in computer viruses their main purpose was
to make the work of anti-virus researchers and applications as difficult as possible.
Today the apparent blending of malicious code writing and hacking gives stealth
code a whole new perspective. Spyware has become a threat to corporate and
personal information security. With the combined techniques of data interception
and stealth, a spyware application can include all the functionality needed for a
perfect information theft. Most of the current spyware lacks the advanced stealth
techniques employed by modern windows rootkits, thus they are incapable of
hiding their presence on a system. Nevertheless signature matching detection
algorithms greatly reduced their effectiveness and this emerged spyware with
rootkit techniques, or as we call it ghostware.
In this work we tested the most popular security tools along with specific
detection tools against ghostware. The results show that, anti-virus programs
or anti-spyware programs are not capable of detecting or removing ghostware
applications. Hidden object detection or rootkit detection tools can be useful,
however, these tools work after the computer is infected and they do not provide
any means for removing the ghostware. As a result, we need understand the
potential application of ghostware and implement new detection and prevention
tools.
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There is so much to be done in this field. First of all an official spyware
definition should be announced which includes the ghostware programs. The
lack of information misleads people and prevents them from taking precautions.
The adware type of spyware hit users very hard because most of the ordinary
users did not see what was coming. It is estimated that spyware infected 67%
to 90% of computers connected to the Internetin year 2005. Panda Anti-Virus
released an online Anti-Virus Scanner that can also detect Spyware in April 2005.
According to their reports [55], in the first 24 hours of the operation, 84 percent
of malicious code detected was spyware and the 74 most detected malicious code
were all spyware programs.
We need new detection and prevention tools for fighting ghostware. As we
explained in Chapter 3, the main approach for detecting a hidden object is com-
paring high level (infected) and low level (uninfected) views of the system. But
getting a low level is hard, because there is not enough documentation for getting
a low level view and the technique must work deeper than any hooking technique
to get the data untampered. At this point, we can get help from the Operating
System. If OS could export some lists for integrity checking (and the lists can
include checksums for its own integrity checking), then detectors work could be
quite easy.
Preventing an infection is quite tricky, because one needs to watch all the
entry points to detect an intrusion. However, this is not possible due of the
lack of documentation about this subject. Programs trying to close gates all
failed when new entry points are found. The documentation of the Windows API
should be better, similar to Unix, so that one can enumerate the possible ways
for hooking APIs. This would allow creation of detectors that simply watch the
gates and avoid intrusion.
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